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Competition and Gender Prejudice:
Are Discriminatory Employers Doomed to Fail?
Abstract
According to Becker’s (1957) famous theory on discrimination, entrepreneurs with a 
strong prejudice against female workers forgo proﬁ  ts by submitting to their tastes. In 
a competitive market their ﬁ  rms lack eﬃ   ciency and are therefore forced to leave. We 
present new empirical evidence for this prediction by studying the survival of startup 
ﬁ  rms in a large longitudinal matched employer-employee data set from Austria. Our 
results show that ﬁ  rms with strong preferences for discrimination, i.e. a low share 
of female employees relatively to the industry average, have signiﬁ  cantly shorter 
survival rates. This is especially relevant for ﬁ  rms starting out with female shares in 
the lower tail of the distribution. They exit about 18 months earlier than ﬁ  rms with a 
median share of females. We see no diﬀ  erences in survival between ﬁ  rms at the top 
of the female share distribution and at the median, though. We further document 
that highly discriminatory ﬁ  rms that manage to survive submit to market powers and 
increase their female workforce over time.
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Becker (1957)’s classical theory - fundament of the formal economic analysis of labor market
discrimination - supposes that the source of discrimination is personal prejudice. Gender
biased employers prefer hiring male workers even if their market wages exceed those of equally
productive females. This behavior gives rise to a gender wage gap and to segregation of
female workers towards less prejudiced employers. However, discrimination does not pay and
prejudiced employers have to give up proﬁts in order to indulge their prejudices. Competitive
market mechanisms should thus ensure that discriminatory employers are replaced by less
prejudiced ﬁrms. In this paper, we investigate empirically whether discrimination is indeed
driven out of the market by studying the survival of new market entrants. The motivation for
our analysis is based on Stigler (1958)’s survivor principle which postulates that competition
between diﬀerent types of ﬁrms sifts out the more eﬃcient enterprizes.
Previous empirical research about the relationship between discrimination and market
competition has pursued two main approaches. The focus of studies at the industry level is
whether in sectors sheltered by regulation employers hire relatively more male workers (Ashen-
felter and Hannan, 1986), or favor male over female workers in terms of wages and promotion
aspects (Black and Brainerd, 2004; Black and Strahan, 2001). More recently, studies at the
ﬁrm level have tested for cross-sectional correlation between female employment and prof-
itability among ﬁrms with varying degree of product market power (Hellerstein et al., 2002;
Kawaguchi, 2007). The ﬁndings in both literatures unanimously support the hypothesis that
discrimination is less evident in more competitive environments.1 However, the existing em-
pirical evidence is primarily based on correlations, while the underlying causal mechanisms
remain largely uninvestigated. Our main contribution, achieved by exploiting information
at the linked ﬁrm-worker level, is to shed light on the process by which market competition
punishes discriminatory behavior. Speciﬁcally, we ask the following two questions: Can dis-
criminatory market entrants survive? Do surviving ﬁrms submit to market pressure and give
1In a meta analysis, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) ﬁnd that countries adopting equal oppor-
tunity legislation have smaller gender wage gaps while countries with institutions that protecting women from
dangerous and strenuous work tend to have higher wage gaps.
4up their discriminatory attributes over time?
To motivate our empirical analysis, we ﬁrst develop a dynamic model of employer discrim-
ination in a market with ﬁrm entry and incomplete information. We consider a framework
where ﬁrms enter each period from a pool of potential ﬁrms with a constant distribution of
discriminatory preferences. Because they are ignorant about the true eﬀects of discrimina-
tion on proﬁtability, entering ﬁrms choose their workers according to Becker’s (1957) decision
strategy, i.e. ﬁrms with low prejudices hire mainly females with lower wages while ﬁrms with a
high level of prejudice hire male workers. Over time, ﬁrms learn about their true proﬁtability,
as in Jovanovic (1982), and decide whether to remain in the market or drop out based on
expected future proﬁts. This model predicts, on the one hand, a long-run persistence of the
gender wage gap and segregation of female workers towards the least discriminatory employ-
ers, because of the constant entry of all types of prejudiced employers. On the other hand,
the model also predicts that ﬁrms with strong prejudices against females are more likely to
leave the market. This second prediction is the focus of our empirical analysis.
We test the model empirically using a sample of newly entering ﬁrms from administrative
matched employer-employee data in Austria over the period 1978-2006. Speciﬁcally, we relate
the ﬁrst year’s share of female employees relative to the industry average to ﬁrm survival.
The data provide a rich array of workforce characteristics which allow us to control for het-
erogeneity in productivity and input costs. After establishing the basic result of a negative
relationship between the share of female employees and exit hazards we perform a series of
robustness checks, motivated by the model and the data, with the aim of ruling out alterna-
tive explanations for our ﬁnding. First, according to the model primarily employers with the
strongest discriminatory preferences are driven out of the market, which implies a non-linear
relationship. We thus test for non-linearity in the eﬀect of the workforce gender composition
on ﬁrm survival and investigate the functional form of the relationship. Second, the share of
female employees is an imperfect proxy for the employer’s prejudicial tastes, if ﬁrms sample
from a limited pool of applicants. Thus even a ﬁrm unaware of its workers’ gender faces a
positive probability of hiring a segregated workforce, and especially if it is a small ﬁrm. We
therefore test whether the relationship between female shares and exit rates is stronger for
5larger ﬁrms.2 Third, we exploit variation in the gender composition of the pool of potential
applicants to test for a correlation of the gender workforce composition with unobserved ﬁrm
characteristics. From the overall fraction of females hired per industry and time period we
construct instrumental variables capturing a supply-push in the female share at the ﬁrm level.
To anticipate our main results the average share of female workers relative to the industry
average by quarter after ﬁrm entry is shown in Figure 1. The black line represents the
development of female shares of all ﬁrms in our sample, while the lines with dots and diamonds
represent restricted samples of ﬁrms surviving at least 5 or 10 years, respectively. We notice
two important features in the graph. First, short lived ﬁrms start out with a signiﬁcantly lower
share of females than those surviving for at least 5 or even 10 years. Second, while the share
of female rises slightly during the ﬁrst 5 years for all ﬁrms, those who started out with lower
female shares see the largest increases. The ﬁrst impression is conﬁrmed by our estimation
results. We ﬁnd a strong negative relationship between the share of female workers and exit
probabilities. This eﬀect is mainly concentrated at the bottom of the distribution: ﬁrms with
relative female shares in the bottom quartile exit about 18 months earlier than ﬁrms with a
median share of females, while there is no diﬀerence in survival between the median and the
top of the female share distribution. We further document that highly discriminatory ﬁrms
that manage to survive submit to market powers and increase their female workforce over
time.
In addition to the papers discussed above, our study contributes to two other strands
of the literature. First, we add to recent work investigating the inﬂuence of demand side
factors on the high rates of gross job ﬂows at the micro level (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999;
Foster et al., 2008b). Our results show that business failures caused by incorrect perceptions
of proﬁtability due to discrimination signiﬁcantly contribute to job turnover. Second, in
the ﬁeld of industrial organization the implications of ﬁrm heterogeneity on ﬁrm turnover
have received a lot of empirical attention (Caves, 1998; Geroski, 1998), while the eﬀects
of selection and turnover on productivity growth have been studied in theoretical models
2The relationship between ﬁrm size and gender or racial composition of the workforce has been used as an
indicator for discrimination in litigation cases in the US (Leonard, 1989).
6(Asplund and Nocke, 2005; Jovanovic, 1982; Klette and Kortum, 2004). Our analysis relates
detailed workforce characteristics to the survival of individual ﬁrms and presents evidence on
the impact of several factors not generally available in representative ﬁrm surveys.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we set up a stylized model of ﬁrm entry
and incomplete information with regard to the eﬀects of gender discrimination on proﬁtability.
Section 3 describes the data, deﬁnes the sample of entering ﬁrms, and introduces the key
variables. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy and presents the results along with a
discussion of alternative interpretations of our ﬁndings. The ﬁnal section 5 concludes.
2 Gender Discrimination in a Model with Firm Entry
To explain labor market discrimination, Becker (1957) introduces agents who are not acting
in response to economic fundamentals but who also take their personal tastes or distastes
into account. The degree to which discriminatory employers behave as if the wage for female
workers were higher than the actual market wage depends on their prejudicial preference
which is assumed to vary continuously among ﬁrms. Consequently, employers with a small
dislike for female workers prefer hiring women if female wages are lower, while employers
with a strong dislike hire male workers even if there is a wage diﬀerential. Market clearing
in the short run ensures that the diﬀerential between male and female wages is positive and
determined by the discriminatory taste of the marginal employer.3 Prejudicial preferences
are satisﬁed at the expense of proﬁts, however, and competitive pressure will therefore force
discriminatory employers out of the market. In consequence, Arrow (1973) argues that in
a perfectly competitive environment only the least discriminatory employers can ultimately
survive and discrimination is eliminated in the long run. This fundamental critique on the
discrimination model has spurred eﬀorts to investigate whether market imperfections block
anti-discriminatory market responses. Recent work shows how prejudicial tastes leads to dis-
3Charles and Guryan (2008) provides clear tests of and evidence for the main predictions in Becker’s
model concerning the relationships between relative wages of black workers, prejudicial tastes among whites,
and preferences of employer at the margin of hiring blacks. We are therefore conﬁdent to use the gender
composition as a proxy for discriminatory taste.
7crimination in setups characterized by imperfect competition (Becker, 1957; Manning, 2003),
incomplete information such as search frictions (Black, 1995; Rosen, 2003), or adjustment
costs (Lang et al., 2005).
In the spirit of this literature we propose a dynamic model which shows how the entry of
ﬁrms with imperfect knowledge about the consequences of decisions inﬂuenced by prejudicial
tastes leads to persistence of market discrimination. At the same time the model incorporates
competitive forces which lead to a selection process by which employers with strong discrimi-
natory tastes are weeded out. Our model combines the basic ideas of employer discrimination
in Becker (1957) with the theory of selection with incomplete information in Jovanovic (1982).
The main intuition is the following: Members from a pool of potential ﬁrms with a constant
distribution of prejudicial tastes enter the market. At entry these ﬁrms are unaware of the
eﬀects of discrimination on their proﬁtability. After entry they receive noisy signals about
the true proﬁts. While ﬁrms with low discriminatory tastes receive positive signals and thus
grow and survive, those with strong desire to discriminate receive negative signals, shrink,
and eventually exit.
For the formal description of the model we follow a setup similar to Jovanovic (1982).
The setting is a small industry with equally productive workers who only diﬀer by gender.
Labor is the only input in production and ﬁrm’s proﬁts in each period t depend on the output
produced minus labor costs
πt = f(Lf + Lm) − wfLf − wmLm +  t (1)
where Lf and Lm are the numbers of female and male workers, wf and wm are the wages of
each group of workers. The  t are ﬁrm speciﬁc shocks, which are independently distributed
over time and across ﬁrms with  t ∼ N(0,σ2
 ).
Firms diﬀer in the taste for discrimination, which aﬀects their perception of worker pro-
ductivity. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms do not choose Lm and Lf to maximize proﬁts πt, but they
maximize perceived proﬁts given by
πd
t = f(Lf + Lm) − (wf + d)Lf − (wm − d)Lm + ct (2)
8The desire for discrimination is expressed by the discrimination coeﬃcient d ≥ 0, which varies
continuously across ﬁrms. Employers with d>0 overestimate the cost of female employees
and underestimate the costs of male workers at the same time. Firms do not know the
true costs of production with certainty and neither do they know the relationship between
discrimination and production costs. In the perceived proﬁt equation the ﬁrm’s uncertainty
about costs is captured by the term ct = c+ t, which consists of a ﬁrm speciﬁc component c
and the independent shocks. Potential ﬁrms assume that c is a random draw from N(0,σ2
c).
Once a ﬁrm enters the market it observes the actual proﬁt πt at the end of each period t and
updates c.
For market entrants the intuition for the hiring decision and the process of updating are
shown in Figure 2. The upper Graph A plots expected costs per worker according to πd
t and
implied hiring decisions for diﬀerent levels of d. Starting from the left, ﬁrms with low levels of
d such that d<
wm−wf
2 expect that costs for females are lower than costs for male employees
and thus decide to hire females. Because of their increasing dislike of female workers the
expected costs are rising. A ﬁrm with d =
wm−wf
2 is indiﬀerent between hiring males or
females, because expected costs are equal. Firms with higher values of d expect hiring costs
for males are lower than those for females, with increasing levels of d the overestimation of
male productivity leads them to expect even lower costs per worker.
At the end of the ﬁrst period in the market ﬁrms observe the true level of proﬁts πt which
they compare to the expectations πd
t to update c. The updating mechanism in absence of the
random shocks is shown schematically in Graph B in Figure 2. Firms that do not discriminate
against women with d = 0 have no reason to update, because their cost expectations are equal
to the actual labor costs. Firms with low values of d who still hire women ﬁnd out that they
were overly pessimistic about the true costs and will revise expected proﬁts upwards in the
next period. Firms with values of d exceeding
wm−wf
2 , on the other hand, are negatively
surprised by the actual proﬁts, because they underestimated the cost of their male employees.
They will thus revise proﬁts downwards in the next period.
After observing actual proﬁts at the end of each period the ﬁrm decides whether to
9continue operation for a further period or to exit the market. We assume that each ﬁrm has a
ﬁxed outside option of value W to which it compares the discounted stream of expected future
proﬁts V (d,c,n,t) from staying in the market for one more period and behaving optimally
afterwards. The available information in each period is given by the discrimination coeﬃcient




max[W,V (d,z,n +1 ,t+ 1)]P(dz|c,n,t). (3)
Entering ﬁrms have to bear a ﬁxed cost of entry k. The entry decision is thus based
on V (d,c,0,t) − k ≥ W. This condition assures that each period ﬁrms with a whole range
of discrimination coeﬃcients enter the market, although V (d,c,0,t) is not the same for all
entering ﬁrms. According to Graph A in Figure 2 ﬁrms with very low and very high values
of d have the highest expectation of future proﬁts, while ﬁrms with intermediate values of d
have a lower V (d,c,0,t). At the end of the ﬁrst period ﬁrms compare actual proﬁts to their
expectations and update. As we have seen in Graph B in Figure 2 ﬁrms with low values of d
are conﬁrmed in their decision or even positively surprised. They will thus grow and continue
operation. Firms with the highest values of d are faced with negative revisions of their prior
expectations and see a need to shrink or exit. The existence of the random shocks  t prevents
ﬁrms from realizing their true costs immediately at the end of the ﬁrst period. Thus even
ﬁrms with high values of d will stay in the market for some time.4
Without providing a formal model solution, we regard the intuition above as suﬃcient
to outline a number model predictions. First, because of constant entry of ﬁrms of all d-
types and their ignorance about the true cost of labor, market clearing requires a positive
wage diﬀerential between male and female workers. The exact magnitude of the diﬀerential is
determined by the distribution of d among potential ﬁrms, the distribution among incumbent
ﬁrms, and the relative supply of female workers. Second, the wage gap determines the ﬁrm’s
hiring strategy in dependence of d. While high d ﬁrms still seek to hire male workers, ﬁrms
4Our formulation of the expected proﬁts deviates from Becker’s original model in that we assume that
discriminators do not only underestimate female productivity with (wf +d) but also overestimate males (wm−
d). We include this feature to make sure that ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of d face similar incentives of entering
the market. If d only implies an underestimation of the productivity of female workers expected proﬁts of high
d ﬁrms, hiring male workers, would be systematically lower than those of ﬁrms hiring females.
10with small levels of prejudice have an incentive to hire females. Third, the selection mechanism
in the model predicts that ﬁrms with high values of d receive negative productivity signals
and eventually leave the market.
The ﬁrst two predictions set the stage for our empirical analysis, by establishing the
existence of a wage gap and the hiring strategy. The correlation between d and the gender
workforce composition implies that a ﬁrm reveals its taste for discrimination by the share of
female workers it hires, which provides us with an observable proxy for discriminatory tastes.
Prediction three, explains the role of selection in driving discriminators out of the market and
is the main focus of our empirical analysis, which tests if discriminatory ﬁrms can survive
in the market. As shown in Graph B in Figure 2 the eﬀect of d on the survival rate aﬀects
especially ﬁrms with the strongest discriminatory tastes should be forced out of the market.
So far we have assumed that ﬁrms are completely unaware of the eﬀects of discrimination
on proﬁts. When realizing actual proﬁts at the end of each period they only update the
idiosyncratic cost component, but do not change the hiring strategy. An alternative updating
strategy could also incorporate ﬁrms learning over time about the true productivity of their
male or female workers. Under this scenario ﬁrms with a strong taste for discrimination would
realize that their male employees are less productive than previously assumed and thus adapt
the gender composition of their workforce. Due to the change in the hiring strategy we should
see an increase in the share of female workers among the surviving ﬁrms and especially for
those ﬁrms with high d who started out with a very low share of female workers.
3 Data and Institutional Background
Austria oﬀers a promising environment to study the relationship between competition and
discrimination, ﬁrst, because of the availability of excellent micro data and second, because the
Austrian society is rather conservative and holds very traditional views about the role women.
The institutional environment reﬂects the potential for prejudices against females. In Austria
anti-discrimination legislation was ﬁrst introduced in 1979 and until then diﬀerent contractual
agreements for men and women in the collective bargaining institutions were common practice
11even if women and men worked on the same jobs. Further, women were banned from work
under conditions involving hardship such as night-shifts or work under extreme temperatures
before Austria joined the European Union in 1995. But the legal environment loosening the
restrictions was not implemented until 2002, so the bans were actually in place for much longer.
In Austria there is no law restricting hiring practices of private sector employers with respect
to gender or minority status of employees. Our understanding of the institutional environment
is that there were no major reforms that would have triggered sudden changes in the labor
market situation of women, such the Equal Pay Act in the UK which had an immediate
impact on the male/female wage diﬀerential (Manning, 1996). Instead, laws reinforcing gender
equality have probably induced slow moving processes and changed prejudices in the society.
Unlike other central European countries which experienced a convergence of the male/female
wage diﬀerential, the gender wage gap in Austria is rather large and has been more or less
stable for decades. For the years 2003-2005, Gruenberger and Zulehner 2009 report wage
diﬀerences of about 22 percent for full-time employees. After controlling for human capital,
horizontal, and vertical segregation the wage gap reduced to 12 percent.5
Our empirical analysis is based on the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which
covers the universe of private sector workers in Austria over the years 1972-2006 (Zweim¨ uller
et al., 2009). Each individual employment spell in the universe is linked to an employer
identiﬁer. We exploit this matched employer-employee structure of the ASSD to construct
our ﬁrm sample. As a starting point we organize the data in a quarterly panel based on the
sample dates February 10, May 10, August 10, and November 10. Panel observations on ﬁrm
size are counts of the number of blue collar and white collar employees per employer id and
sample date. In terms of time invariant employer characteristics the ASSD provides regional
and industry indicators, at the postal code and 4 digit NACE levels, respectively.
5Geisberger (2007) ﬁnd that the gender wage gap in 2002 was of about 26 percent and accounting for
individual characteristics like education and experience and occupational segregation it is about 19 percent.
B¨ oheim, Hofer and Zulehner (2007) ﬁnd that the gender wage gap in Austria hardly changed between 1997 and
1983. In 1983, women earned on average a quarter less than men did. If diﬀerences in education, job position,
and the like, are taken into account, womens’ earnings are on average about 17 percent lower than mens’. In
1997, the mean raw wage gap dropped to 23.3 percent of men’s wages. Controlling for observable diﬀerences,
the unexplained average diﬀerence in wages between men and women was 14 per cent. At the beginning of
the 1980s the gender wage gap was about 37 percent in the private sector, and about 12 percent in the public
sector (Zweim¨ uller and Winter-Ebmer 1994).
12The employer identiﬁcation number in the ASSD is a number assigned for administrative
purposes, which means that this concept does not allow us to a-priori distinguish between
ﬁrms or establishments. As the majority of the identiﬁers corresponds to small units one might
be inclined to argue that they are more likely establishments. However, as is demonstrated
in Kalkbrenner et al. (2009) by comparing the ﬁrm demographics implied from the ASSD
in the year 2005 with the respective numbers from Statistik Austria (2009), these units are
actually ﬁrms. The life span of a ﬁrm can be measured by the time between appearance and
disappearance of an employer id in the data. To be precise, it is deﬁned as the time between
the quarter date after the entry of the ﬁrst employee and the quarter date preceding the exit
of the last one. Because of the administrative nature of the employer identiﬁers it is unclear,
however, whether a new appearance (or disappearance) corresponds to a ﬁrm entry (or exit)
or if the ﬁrm was just assigned a new identiﬁer. We thus analyze worker ﬂows to identify
true entries and exits. Our strategy is to drop observations from the sample where a a new
identiﬁer appears, but a signiﬁcant fraction (more than 50%) of the workforce in the ﬁrst
year transited jointly from the same previous employer. We apply an analogous deﬁnition to
identify exits or ﬁrm closures. If a signiﬁcant fraction of the workers in the last year before
disappearance of the identiﬁer jointly move to the same new employer the event does not
correspond to a closure. In this case we mark the ﬁrm’s survival time as censored. For an
exact deﬁnition of the entry and exit types we can identify in the ASSD and descriptives of
Austrian ﬁrm dynamics see Kalkbrenner et al. (2009).6
Starting from the initial sample of 303,030 ﬁrms who have at least 5 employees at one
quarter date between 1972 and 2006 we apply a series of restrictions to arrive at our primary
analysis sample. The restrictions are summarized in Table 1. We exclude ﬁrms operating
in the public administration, construction, or tourism sectors. Employment in the Austrian
construction and tourism industry is highly seasonal and many ﬁrms temporarily close down
all activity during the oﬀ-season which makes it diﬃcult to identify entries and exits. To
rule out left censored spells and because of inconsistencies in recording in the early 1970’s,
we only use ﬁrms entering after 1977. Likewise, we restrict the sample to ﬁrms entering
6Our strategy is similar to the one used by Benedetto et al. (2007) to analyze ﬁrm dynamics in the US.
13before 2004 to be able to follow each ﬁrm for at least 2 years after entry. We drop ﬁrms
that have long periods with zero employees (four consecutive quarter dates) or which have
zero employees repeatedly (more than 8 quarters). This is to eliminate ﬁrms with seasonal
employment patterns in sectors other than construction or tourism.7 To avoid bias in the
survival size relationship, we restrict the sample to ﬁrms with 5 or more employees on at least
one quarter date in the ﬁrst year. We only consider ﬁrms which we can observe for at least
one year after entering the records. From the resulting sample of 51,695 entering ﬁrms we
ﬁnally drop those which can not be identiﬁed as true entries using our worker ﬂow deﬁnition.
We are left with an analysis sample of 29,935 new ﬁrms.
As shown in Table 2 the median survival time among new ﬁrms, censored and uncensored,
is 6.25 years. A fraction of 74% of survival times is right censored, the major part of the
censoring (47%) occurs at the end of the observation period, while the rest is due to exits
that are not identiﬁed as closures.
Our proxy of discriminatory taste at the ﬁrm level is given by the share of female employees
relative to the industry and time average deﬁned by ˜ rijt =
rijt−¯ rjt+1
2 . Here rijt is the share
of females employed in new ﬁrm i, industry j and time period t, and ¯ rjt is the share of
female employees in industry j and time period t. We obtain ˜ rijt by taking the residual
from a regression of the share of female employees at the ﬁrm level on industry, year, and
quarter dummy variables. The resulting measure is normalized to lie between zero and one.
As industry classiﬁcation, we use a mixture of the 3-digit and 4-digit code; 4-digit industries
with only very few ﬁrms are aggregated to the 3-digit level, otherwise we use the 4-digit level.
Histograms in ﬁgure 3 compare the distributions of the raw female shares at the ﬁrm level
with the female shares relative to the industry means. The variation in female shares with a
signiﬁcant mass of ﬁrms with fully segregated workforce is reduced considerably once we take
the industry averages into account.
Other workforce characteristics calculated at the quarterly level are the mean age of
workers, the share of white collar workers, and the median monthly wage. In addition to
7Note also that identiﬁers of exiting ﬁrms may have been reassigned to new businesses after a period of 2
years.
14stocks at the quarter dates, we also observe ﬂows of entries and exits of workers between
quarter dates. In the analysis of new ﬁrms we focus especially on worker entries or ”hires”
during the ﬁrst year of ﬁrm existence. We calculate the turnover rate during the ﬁrst year by
the number of hires over the number of workers still employed by the end of the ﬁrst year.
Further information on the type of hires can be constructed from the longitudinal structure
of each worker’s employment career. We divide the overall number of hires into the fraction
hired from employment, unemployment, or out of the labor force. Likewise, we compare
previous wages of hires with their wages in the new ﬁrm and calculate the share of hires who
experienced a wage gain (more than 5% increase), wage loss, or no change in wages. Using
the previous employer id of new hires we can identify teams of workers, which used to share
a workplace in the past. A variable expressing shared experiences in the workforce is thus
given by the share of this largest team in total hires.
Summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis of new ﬁrms are presented in
Table 3. Quarterly stocks are measured at the 4th quarter date after entry. We can see that the
average size of new ﬁrms is moderate with 11 employees. The female share among employees is
46%; note that this is a sample of ﬁrms excluding the male dominated construction sector. The
majority of workers is hired directly from their last job, without intervening unemployment
spell. A high fraction of 36% of hires also experienced a signiﬁcant wage gain with the job
transition. Table 3 also shows that ﬁrm entry varies over the calender year, with a higher
fraction (39%) entering in the ﬁrst quarter. The workforce of ﬁrms surviving for 5 years grows
by 31% on average from year 1 to year 5.
We would like to stress that the major advantage of our data, beside the large sample size
and long observation period, is that it allows the construction of a wealth of very detailed
workforce characteristics, which are not usually available in micro-level longitudinal ﬁrm sur-
veys. We will use those as determinants of ﬁrm survival in the empirical analysis. Apart
from the workforce and payroll, however, there is no information on proﬁts, other measures
of output, prices, or technology.
154 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model in section 2 predicts that new market entrants with a strong prejudice
against females reveal their preference by hiring a share of male workers above the market av-
erage. Because this behavior diminishes proﬁts they face diﬃculties in sustaining competitive
market pressure and leave the market in favor of their competitors. We test this fundamental
prediction on the impact of competition on ﬁrms with strong taste for discrimination, by re-
lating the relative share of females in the workforce rijt, measured in the fourth quarter after
ﬁrm entry, to ﬁrm survival using a Cox proportional hazard model. An alternative reaction
to market pressure involves learning about market fundamentals. Thereby discriminatory
employers should increase the relative share of females over time. We test this in a regression
analysis examining the relationship between the initial relative female share and the growth
rate in the relative female share over the ﬁrst ﬁve years for surviving ﬁrms.
Before presenting the estimation results we discuss two strategies that allow us to assess
the robustness of our results.
Sampling Bias in the Proxy for Employer Prejudice
In the previous section we have motivated the use of the share of females in the workforce
as a proxy for discriminatory employer tastes. The quality of the approximation is, however,
subject to sampling bias that is negatively correlated with ﬁrm size. To see this, imagine a
small ﬁrm with 5 employees entering the market. Even if the employer is perfectly gender-
neutral he/she is faced with the choice of hiring 3 or 4 female workers or a corresponding
female share of 40% or 60%, respectively. In this case the variation in the female share is
related to the chance that the last worker hired happens to be a man or a woman rather than
to diﬀerences in discriminatory tastes. For a larger ﬁrm, on the other hand, the variation in
the female share should be more revealing about the employer’s preferences. More generally,
the argument is that even a gender-neutral employer, hiring workers by randomly drawing
from a pool of applicants regardless of their gender, faces a positive probability of ending up
with a segregated workforce. Of course, the probability decreases in the total number of hires.
16If the relationship between the share of female hires and ﬁrm survival is due to discriminatory
behavior we would thus expect to ﬁnd less attenuation by sampling bias in the estimates and
stronger eﬀects for larger entrants.
Exogenous Variation in the Supply of Female Workers
To get an idea whether the relationship between the share of female workers and ﬁrm survival
is driven by unobserved factors rather than a causal connection we exploit the variation in
supply shift factors. The idea here is to model the pool of potential applicants for each new
ﬁrm and to examine whether variation in the gender composition of applicants determines
the female share at the ﬁrm level using an instrumental variables strategy. So the question
we are asking is: What happens to ﬁrm survival if a gender-neutral employer is driven to hire
relatively more male workers, because of the dominance of male applicants in the market? If
ﬁrm survival is unaﬀected by variation in the female share that is due to exogenous supply
shifts this would be evidence that unobservable factors such as technology are driving the
relationship between survival and the gender workforce composition.
Our strategy is to model the pool of potential applicants by the total set of hires in new and
established ﬁrms occurring in the corresponding quarter at the industry and region level. We
argue that the gender composition in the hires is likely driven by supply shift factors releasing
either more women or more men to the market. Speciﬁcally, we experiment with two sets of
instruments for the relative female share. The ﬁrst set is given by the ratio of female hires
to all hires per region and industry in the quarter of ﬁrm entry and in the subsequent three
quarters. There is a tradeoﬀ between the number of industry region cells and the amount of
variation provided by the instruments. If we use too small cells the number of hires will be
determined by the entering ﬁrms only. Therefore, we deﬁne industries at the 2-digit NACE
level, for regions we use the 2-digit NUTS deﬁnition.8 This instrumental variable strategy
captures symmetric responses to positive and negative supply shocks of female workers and
disregards the possibility of diﬀerent reactions for smaller and larger ﬁrms.
848 industries * 9 regions = 432 cells per quarter
17Our second approach attempts to model hiring behavior given the gender composition in
the pool of applicants and ﬁrm size more closely. We construct sets of instruments based on
the predicted probabilities that a ﬁrm selects a low share or a high share of females given the
share of females in total hires in each of the ﬁrst four quarters as well as ﬁrm size at the end
of year one. Thereby we assume that the ﬁrm is gender-neutral and samples workers from
the pool of potential applicants in independent random draws. The probabilities that ﬁrm i
in period t ends up with a low (high) female share rijst - that is a female share in the bottom
(top) quartile r(25)js (r(75)js) of the long-run distribution of industry j and region s - are given
































jst(1 − pjst)n(75)it−k (5)
where pjst is the female share in total hires and n(25)it = sizeijst ∗ r(25)js and n(75)it =
sizeijst ∗ r(75)js with sizeijst being the size of ﬁrm i in period t. The expression in equation
(4) is particularly sensitive to a variation in the female share in market hires at the bottom
of the distribution, while equation (5) is more sensitive to variation at the top. In addition,
the variation in the sensitive areas is always higher for larger ﬁrms than for small ﬁrms. This
allows us to concentrate on variation in exogenous supply conditions of larger ﬁrms. As before,
we calculate the instruments for each of the ﬁrst four quarters of a ﬁrm’s existence and classify
industry and region at the 2-digit NACE and NUTS levels.
4.1 Estimation Results
The presentation of estimation results starts with hazard models of ﬁrm survival, which
examine the basic relationship between the relative female share of workers and ﬁrm survival
as well as the non-linearity the relationship in table 4. Then we proceed to the instrumental
variables strategy using a control function approach in table 5 and present ﬁndings about the
18determinants of the growth in the relative female share in table 6.
4.1.1 Firm Survival
Table 4 presents results from Cox regressions. We start with a simple speciﬁcation in column
(1), which relates the exit hazard to the relative share of female employees and some ﬁrm
characteristics. All models also control for industry, region, year, and quarter eﬀects using
a rich set of dummy variables.9 The share of female workers has a strong negative eﬀect on
exit rates. The coeﬃcient estimate implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of
females hired reduces the exit hazard by about 50%. The eﬀects of the remaining variables are
also of interest. The share of white collar workers and the median wage, both possibly related
to the qualiﬁcation level of the workforce, have a positive eﬀects on the survival probability.
Firms starting with a larger workforce survive longer as well. Foster et al. (2008a) argue that
the initial size of a ﬁrm may reﬂect idiosyncratic demand conditions; the higher the initial
demand the higher is the probability to survive. The eﬀect of the average worker’s age is
negative.
In the next two columns we add further variables to the initial model. We do this to
ﬁnd out whether the relative female share is correlated with other ﬁrm characteristics that
are relevant for productivity. Adding characteristics derived from the workers’ employment
careers, however, does not lead to a major change in the coeﬃcient on the relative share of
female workers. Its magnitude is slightly reduced but the main eﬀect appears to be robust.
The share of workers hired from previous jobs has a strongly positive eﬀect on ﬁrm survival,
while hiring for wages that diﬀer from their last wage increases the exit probability. The eﬀect
is bigger for hires with a wage loss, though, which reﬂects workers who have been possibly
overpaid in their last jobs. A high turnover rate of workers in the ﬁrst year appears to be
detrimental for ﬁrm survival. Firms who succeed in hiring teams workers who used to work
9We do not use the market concentration or the Hirsch-Herﬁndahl-Index as measures of the competitive
environment in an industry. As Austria is a small open economy, these measures do not necessarily reﬂect the
competitive environment. For example, the ﬁgures for market concentration might be equal for a local industry
and a market with the same number of ﬁrms but facing international competition. Therefore, we think that
dummy variables for industries are more appropriate. To account for changes in the competitive environment
over time, we estimated our empirical model for ﬁve year periods. The estimated eﬀects do not change.
19together in the past face a large increase in the probability to survive. Overall, these results
conﬁrm that the female share is not strongly correlated with other observable determinants
of survival.
In column (4) we investigate the functional form of the relationship between the relative
female share and ﬁrm survival by adding quadratic term. The result strongly conﬁrm the
hypothesis supported by theory that the eﬀect should be a non-linear. To visualize the
functional form, we plot the the implied parabola along with results form a more ﬂexible
speciﬁcation using dummy variables for deciles of the relative female share distribution in left
graph in ﬁgure 4. The result is striking: predominantly ﬁrms with the lowest shares of female
workers are driven out of the market. The eﬀect from increasing the female share for ﬁrms
above the third tertile of the distribution is zero. To the magnitude of the eﬀect on ﬁrms with
strong prejudice is also considerable. For ﬁrms with very low female share (lowest quartile
relative to the industry average) we estimate an increase in the exit rate of 20 percentage
points relative to ﬁrms with a median relative share of females. Given a median survival time
of 6.25 years, this corresponds to a reduction of the time the ﬁrms stays in the market by 18
months.
Columns ﬁve and six in table 4 show the eﬀects for samples of larger ﬁrms. We restrict
the sample to ﬁrms with at least ten employees and in column (5) and to ﬁrms with at least
15 employees in column (6). At small levels of the relative female share the negative slope in
the eﬀect on the exit rate increases when we move to samples with increasing average ﬁrm
size. This is also visualized in the right graph in ﬁgure 4, which is based on results from the
sample in column (5). This ﬁnding conﬁrms our prediction that the eﬀect of discrimination
is stronger for larger ﬁrms, resembling the quality of the approximation of discriminatory
prejudice by the relative female share.
4.1.2 Instrumental Variable Analysis
The most straightforward way to account for endogeneity in a nonlinear model, like our
survival equation, is via a control function approach, which introduces residuals from the
20reduced form for the regressors as covariates in the structural model (Blundell and Powell,
2003). We thus use a a two-step estimation procedure: in the ﬁrst step we estimate a reduced
form equation regressing the relative female share on the instruments and the additional
exogenous variables. The second stage model includes ﬂexible functions of the reduced form
residuals in the Cox regression model of ﬁrm survival. In table 5, we present estimation
results for linear and the quadratic models. For comparison, columns (1) and (4) are copied
from table 4 and refer to the results without adjustment for endogeneity of the relative female
share. In columns (2) and (5) we use the ﬁrst set of instruments derived from the share of
female hires at the industry and regional level, while columns (3) and (6) are using the second
set of instruments based on the probabilities of observing a low or a high female share given
ﬁrm size, and industry, region share of female hires.
In the ﬁrst stage equations both sets of instruments have signiﬁcant impacts on the relative
female share at the ﬁrm level. A lower share of female applicants at the market level also
lowers the share of female workers in new ﬁrms or increases the probability that new ﬁrms
end up with a low relative female share. Values of the F-test for joint signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients are 23.85 and 15.01 for the ﬁrst and second set of instruments, respectively.10 If
we look at the point estimates in the second stage results in table 5 all coeﬃcients imply a
negative impact of the relative share of female workers on exit rates. The magnitudes of the
coeﬃcient estimates are in line with the unadjusted models. But standard errors are large,
especially in the linear models. In the quadratic models, the instrumental variables estimates
yield signiﬁcant eﬀects on the relative share of female workers and the point estimates hardly
diﬀer from the unadjusted model in the case of the second set of instruments based on the
probabilities of hiring low or high female shares. The control function terms are insigniﬁcant,
however, which could imply that relative female share is not endogenous with respect to ﬁrms
survival. Or in other words, unobserved heterogeneity doesn’t play a major role when it comes
to the relationship between the share of female workers and survival prospects of the ﬁrm.
Even a gender-neutral ﬁrm hiring a large number of male workers, because there is a lack of
supply from females, faces a higher exit probability.
10The results for the ﬁrst stage regressions for both sets of instruments can be found in Appendix table A.1.
214.1.3 Growth of the Relative Female Share
Table 6 presents results from linear regressions with the growth rate in the share of female
employees from year 1 to year 5 as the dependent variable for the set of ﬁrms surviving at
least 5 years. Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) we calculate the growth rate in the
female share as the diﬀerence in female share between year 1 and year 5 over the average
female share during that period grit =
˜ ri(t+16)−˜ rit
0.5(˜ rit+˜ ri(t+16)) to obtain a value in [−2,2].
The results show that ﬁrms starting out with a low relative female share in the ﬁrst year
experience a stronger growth than ﬁrms starting with high female shares. This eﬀect appears
to be non-linear as well, implying that ﬁrms starting out with the lowest female share take an
extra eﬀort to pick up to the industry average. We take this as evidence for a learning eﬀect.
If a discriminatory employer, hiring few female workers initially, manages to survive, he will
adapt his hiring strategies and increase the female share over the ﬁrst 5 years.
4.2 Discussion: Alternative Explanations
On the whole, the results presented above are strongly supportive of the theoretical predic-
tion that competitive pressure drives discriminatory employers out of the market. But are
they strong enough to provide evidence for a causal relationship between discrimination and
employer success? Obviously also other interpretations are compatible with our results. Here
we discuss alternative explanations of our ﬁndings in turn and argue why we think that taking
all pieces of evidence together our interpretation is more convincing.
Technology as a Source of Unobserved Heterogeneity Our empirical research design is
based on the hypothesis that competition sifts out more productive ﬁrms. Variables that
determine ﬁrm survival should therefore also be related to proﬁtability. The interpretation of
the negative eﬀect of the relative female share on exit rates is that it proxies for discriminatory
prejudices which bear a higher cost on the ﬁrm. However, the female share could be correlated
with other productivity relevant factors as well. We included a rich set of controls in the
regressions to test for correlation of the female share with observable ﬁrm characteristics.
The results show that even after controlling for all observable factors, the eﬀect of the female
22share on survival is still substantial. This leaves unobserved productivity related variables,
like technology, as sources of potential bias. It could be that ﬁrms using more advanced
technologies hire more women, because their production processes require less of the menial
work mostly done by males. The instrumental variables strategy based on the supply-push
argument is designed to confront this argument by exploiting variation in female shares at
the market level. Estimates from the control function models reinforce the main result and
provide evidence against omitted variables bias.
Further evidence against the concern that our results might be driven by unobserved
heterogeneity comes from the strong non-linearity in the eﬀect. Although we lack information
on several measures of proﬁtability that might be correlated with the gender distribution of
the workforce, it hard to imagine why their eﬀects would be concentrated at the lowest levels
of the female share.
Females Hired in Part-Time Work One shortcoming of the data is that it does not provide
information on working hours and we thus cannot identify whether an employee is working
part-time or full-time. This is a disadvantage as part-time work is especially prominent among
females and there is evidence that part of the gender wage gap is due to women working in
part-time jobs (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). Hiring cheap part-time workers might not
only be a cost eﬀective option but also allows for ﬂexible reactions to demand shocks. To
deal with this argument we use the observation that part-time work is highly concentrated in
certain occupations. Controlling for industry indicators at a narrow level, allows us to capture
some of the occupational eﬀects. In addition, we estimated models for a restricted sample of
industries with a low share of part-time employment. Results are shown in Appendix table
A.2. Although the eﬀect of the female share on ﬁrm survival is somewhat smaller among the
selected industries, the relationship is still signiﬁcantly negative. Therefore we conclude that
the basic result is not driven by ﬁrm heterogeneity in the use of part-time work.
Higher Risk Aversion Among Females A growing literature demonstrates systematic gen-
der diﬀerences in risk aversion and competitiveness (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2007). If women are less willing to take the risk of job loss they might select into
23ﬁrms that are oﬀering more stability. The diﬀerence in gender workforce composition between
failing and surviving ﬁrms might thus be the result from selection by employees rather than
the employer’s preferences. However, it is probably much harder to make a prediction about
future job stability for new ﬁrms than for established ﬁrms with a well-known record. While
there may be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in worker preferences for new versus established ﬁrms
between genders11, it is less plausible that workers are able to predict the risk of failure of
newly entering ﬁrms. In addition, we ﬁnd stronger eﬀects for larger ﬁrms which typically oﬀer
more stable jobs. This allows us to rule out employee selection by ﬁrm size.
Managerial Ability and Social Interactions Another crucial factor for the success of a new
ﬁrm, which is unobservable in the data, is the manager’s ability. It seems plausible that
managerial ability is negatively correlated with discriminatory prejudice, which would imply
that managers who realize that discrimination is detrimental for proﬁts, are also better at
taking decisions in other areas that are crucial for success. In this case the eﬀect from a low
female share on ﬁrm survival would capture the negative impact of bad management practices
in general with discrimination being one of them.
In the theoretical model the competitive advantage of ﬁrms with low levels of prejudice
is due to lower wage costs and the correct perception of female versus male productivity that
determines the expected ﬂow of proﬁts. Additional factors relevant for the success of non-
discriminatory ﬁrms, could be due to an improvement of social interactions among workers
in a less male-dominated environment. Experimental evidence highlights substantial produc-
tivity gains from social interaction among coworkers or between managers and subordinates
(Bandiera et al., 2005, 2009).12
11The eﬀects of starting a new job in a new ﬁrm as opposed to starting a job in and established ﬁrm on
individual careers is the subject of future research.
12In related research we examine whether the female share is correlated with the gender of high wage workers
hired in the ﬁrst month of ﬁrm existence (Weber and Zulehner, 2009).
245 Summary and Policy Implications
In this paper we have examined whether market competition contributes to the reduction of
discrimination against females. In the presence of a gender wage gap discriminatory employers
should reveal their preferences by hiring relatively more male workers than the average ﬁrm.
Our strategy is thus to relate the share of female workers relative to the industry average to
ﬁrm survival, the ultimate measure of its economic success. The empirical analysis is set in
Austria where labor market institutions have historically promoted diﬀerential treatment of
female and male workers. The Austrian Social Security database provides excellent micro-data
on the life spans of large sample newly entering ﬁrms plus a number of workforce characteristics
based on individual employment careers.
We ﬁnd strong indication for a negative eﬀect of relative female share on exit rates, which
is not diminished by the inclusion of a rich set of other productivity relevant variables in the
regression model. This eﬀect is mainly concentrated at the bottom of the distribution: ﬁrms
with relative female shares in the bottom quartile exit about 18 months earlier than ﬁrms with
a median share of females, while there is no diﬀerence in survival between the median and the
top of the female share distribution. We regard this as strong evidence for the competitive
pressure which drives discriminatory employers out of the market.
We further analyze the growth in the relative female share for ﬁrms that survive for at
least 5 years. The initial share of female workers has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the growth of the
female share over the ﬁrst ﬁve years. We ﬁnd that highly discriminatory ﬁrms that manage
to survive submit to market powers and increase their female workforce over time.
Do our results imply that competition makes anti-discrimination legislation obsolete?
We would not agree to this statement. Although our results show that competitive pressure
eliminates businesses with discriminatory preferences above the equilibrium level, policy eﬀort
may still be required to change the equilibrium level.
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30Figure 2: The eﬀect of the level of discrimination on expected and actual costs per worker
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33Table 1: Sample of Startup Firms
Number of Firms Percentage
Selection of Firms
Firms operating 1972-2006 with at least 5 workers 303,030
Excl. construction, tourism and public administration 174,988 -42%
Firms entering 1978 and later 119,567 -32%
Firms entering before 2003 104,000 -13%
No periods with zero employees longer than one year 96,698 -7%
No periods with zero employees more often than 8 times 95,805 -1%
At least 5 workers employed in the ﬁrst year 56,218 -41%
Firms surviving one year 51,695 -8%
Classiﬁcation of Startup Firms
Change ﬁrm identiﬁer 7,783 15%
Spinoﬀ ﬁrms 13,977 27%
New ﬁrms 29,935 58%
Notes: Firms correspond to ﬁrm identiﬁers in the Austrian Social Security Database. Change of ﬁrm identiﬁer
deﬁned by at least 70% of workers switching together from one ﬁrm identiﬁer to the next, both ﬁrms of similar
size, and previous ﬁrm identiﬁer vanishes from the data. Spinoﬀs are deﬁned as ﬁrms where at least 50% of
workers switch together. All remaining ﬁrms are new ﬁrms.
Table 2: Survival Times of New Firms
New Firms
Median survival time (in years) 6.25
Mean survival time 8.67
Censored observations 73.8%
Observations censored in 2006 46.9%
Number of ﬁrms 29,935
Notes: Observations are considered as censored if the ﬁrm identiﬁer vanishes from the data but the event
cannot be identiﬁed as plant closure or at the end of the observation period in the last quarter of 2006. Firms
correspond to ﬁrm identiﬁers in the Austrian Social Security Database.
34Table 3: Firm Characteristics in the Fourth Quarter after Entry
New Firms
Variable Mean Std.dev
Number of workers 10.82 15.34
Female workers 4.76 8.75
White collar workers 6.08 10.75
Average worker age 33.79 5.57
Share of female workers 0.46 0.33
Share of females relative to industry average -0.03 0.25
Median monthly wage 1255.0 591.0
Median wage males 1469.0 668.3
Median wage females 1050.1 520.7
Ratio female to male median wage 0.87 0.24
Turnover rate 1.83 0.64
Share hired from employment 0.53 0.23
Share hired from unemployment 0.23 0.20
Share without wage change 0.21 0.17
Share with negative wage change 0.23 0.17
Share with positive wage change 0.36 0.19
Share from largest team 0.32 0.19
Entry in ﬁrst quarter 0.39 0.49
Entry in second quarter 0.21 0.41
Entry in third quarter 0.20 0.40
Entry in forth quarter 0.20 0.40
Growth rates year 1 to 5 Employment growth 0.061 0.942
Employment growth cond. on survival 0.310 0.878
Growth in Female Share cond. on survival 0.005 0.199
Number of observations 29,935
Notes: Firms entering between 1978 and 2003. Turnover rate is deﬁned as the number of employees hired
during the ﬁrst year over the number employed in the fourth quarter. Share of female workers relative to
industry average is measured by the ratio of female to all employees relative to 3-digit industry average. Share
hired from employment, unemployment etc. refers to all workers hired in the ﬁrst year. Firms correspond to
employer identiﬁers in the Austrian Social Security Database.
35Table 4: Determinants of Firm Survival - Basic Speciﬁcations
All Firms Larger Firms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Female Employees -0.930 -0.753 -0.749 -3.626 -5.246 -6.207
Rel. to Industry Average (0.106) (0.105) (0.103) (0.468) (0.783) (1.258)
Share of Female Employees 2.963 4.470 5.324
Rel. to Industry Average Squared (0.470) (0.798) (1.290)
Share from Employment -1.180 -0.689 -0.653 -0.705 -1.029
(0.073) (0.089) (0.089) (0.139) (0.218)
Share from Unemployment -0.157 -0.115 -0.099 -0.217 -0.460
(0.085) (0.088) (0.088) (0.139) (0.226)
Share with Wage Gain 0.436 0.373 0.365 0.469 0.317
(0.075) (0.077) (0.077) (0.119) (0.196)
Share with Wage Loss 0.653 0.587 0.573 0.839 1.001
(0.081) (0.084) (0.084) (0.133) (0.216)
Turnover Rate 0.370 0.357 0.322 0.218
(0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.051)
Share from Largest Team -0.651 -0.651 -0.663 -0.598
(0.092) (0.092) (0.142) (0.221)
Share of White Collar Workers -0.256 -0.158 -0.038 -0.032 0.089 -0.071
Rel. to Industry Average (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) (0.091) (0.148) (0.228)
Firm Size -0.715 -0.728 -0.626 -0.584 -0.555 -0.325
(0.134) (0.131) (0.127) (0.125) (0.161) (0.159)
Median Wage -0.468 -0.314 -0.236 -0.221 -0.081 0.039
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.054) (0.084)
Average Worker Age 0.008 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.029
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 29879 29879 29879 29879 14964 7484
log-likelihood -74679 -74441 -74212 -74190 -31721 -13601
Notes: Estimation results from Cox regressions. Dependent variable is the survival time in quarters. Standard
errors in parenthesis. Share of female workers relative to industry average is measured by the ratio of female
to all employees relative to 3-digit industry average. Largest group is the share of the largest group of workers
who worked together in the same previous ﬁrm. Column 5 includes ﬁrms with at least 10 employees; column
6 includes ﬁrms with at least 15 employees. All regressions also control for 22 year eﬀects, 3 quarter eﬀects,
160 industry eﬀects, and 35 region speciﬁc eﬀects.
36Table 5: Determinants of Firm Survival - Instrumental Variable Results
Linear Models Quadratic Models
IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Female Employees -0.749 -1.406 -1.112 -3.626 -4.259 -3.815
(0.103) (1.137) (1.115) (0.468) (1.366) (-3.815 )
Share of Female Employees Squared 2.963 2.893 2.921
(0.470) (0.803) (0.806 )
Residual from the ﬁrst stage 0.654 0.362 0.701 0.228
(1.140) (1.119) (1.140) (1.117)
Residual from the ﬁrst stage squared 0.085 0.033
(0.919) (0.925)
Share from Employment -0.689 -0.658 -0.672 -0.653 -0.619 -0.642
(0.089) (0.103) (0.101) (0.089) (0.103) (0.101)
Share from Unemployment -0.115 -0.093 -0.101 -0.099 -0.075 -0.088
(0.088) (0.093) (0.092) (0.088) (0.093) (0.092)
Share with Wage Gain 0.373 0.362 0.366 0.367 0.355 0.361
(0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
Share with Wage Loss 0.587 0.519 0.558 0.548 0.500 0.548
(0.084) (0.142) (0.138) (0.084) (0.141) (0.139)
Turnover Rate 0.370 0.370 0.370 0.357 0.357 0.357
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Share from Largest Team -0.651 -0.660 -0.656 -0.651 -0.660 -0.653
(0.092) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093)
Share of White Collar Workers -0.038 0.125 0.027 0.052 0.142 0.026
Rel. to Industry Average (0.092) (0.295) (0.289) (0.091) (0.295) (0.228)
Firm Size -0.626 -0.609 -0.615 -0.584 -0.566 -0.577
(0.127) (0.129) (0.129) (0.125) (0.127) (0.127)
Median Wage -0.236 -0.302 -0.272 -0.221 -0.291 -0.244
(0.035) (0.117) (0.115) (0.035) (0.117) (0.115)
Average Worker Age 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of observations 29879 29829 29829 29879 29829 29829
log Likelihood -74212 -74083 -74104 -74190 -74063 -74083
Notes: Estimation results from Cox regressions. Dependent variable is the survival time in quarters. Standard
errors in parenthesis. In columns (2) and (5) we use the share of female hires in the ﬁrst four quarters of entry
at the 2-digit industry and nuts2 regional levels as an instruments for the share of female workers; in columns
(3) and (6) we use the probabilities to hire a female share in the top or bottom quartiles of the long run female
share distribution determined by aggregate hires in the ﬁrst four quarters and ﬁrm size as instruments for the
share of female workers. All regressions also control for 22 year eﬀects, 3 quarter eﬀects, 160 industry eﬀects,
and 35 region speciﬁc eﬀects.
37Table 6: Determinants of the Growth Rate in the Share of Female Employees for Surviving
Fimrs
Linear Model Quadratic model
Variable (1) (2)
Share of Female Employees Rel. to Industry Average -0.545 -1.449
(0.017) (0.122)
Share of Female Employees Rel. to Industry Average Squared 0.911
(0.114)
Share from Employment 0.002 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
Share from Unemployment -0.007 -0.005
(0.013) (0.013)
Share with Wage Gain -0.020 -0.021
(0.009) (0.009)
Share with Wage Loss -0.017 -0.020
(0.011) (0.011)
Turnover Rate 0.007 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Share from Largest Group -0.018 -0.019
(0.011) (0.010)
Share of White Collar Workers Rel. to Industry Average 0.030 0.034
(0.013) (0.013)
Firm Size 0.002 0.009
(0.005) (0.005)
Median Wage -0.013 -0.012
(0.005) (0.004)
Average Worker Age -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of observations 19048 19048
R-squared adjusted 0.10 0.11
Notes: Estimation results from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the growth rate from year one to year
ﬁve in the share of female employees conditional on survival. Standard errors in parenthesis. Share of female
workers relative to industry average is measured by the ratio of female to all employees relative to 3-digit
industry average. Largest group is the largest group of workers who worked together in the same previous ﬁrm.
All regressions also control for 22 year eﬀects, 3 quarter eﬀects, 160 industry eﬀects, and 35 region speciﬁc
eﬀects.
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Table A.1: First Stage: Determinants of the Relative Female Share
Variable (1) (2)
Aggregate Hires Quarter 1 0.152
(0.018)
Aggregate Hires Quarter 2 -0.03
(0.015)
Aggregate Hires Quarter 3 -0.005
(0.015)
Aggregate Hires Quarter 4 0.001
(0.015)
Prob low female share given aggr. hires Quarter1 -0.047
(0.012)
Prob low female share given aggr. hires Quarter2 0.038
(0.011)
Prob low female share given aggr. hires Quarter3 -0.013
(0.012)
Prob low female share given aggr. hires Quarter4 -0.01
(0.010)
Prob high female share given aggr. hires Quarter1 0.025
(0.011)
Prob high female share given aggr. hires Quarter 2 0.034
(0.013)
Prob high female share given aggr. hires Quarter 3 -0.009
(0.012)
Prob high female share given aggr. hires Quarter 4 -0.006
(0.010)
Share of White Collar Workers 0.246 0.247
(0.012) (0.012)
Share from Employment 0.043 0.045
(0.009) (0.009)
Share from Unemployment 0.025 0.027
(0.007) (0.007)
Share with Wage Gain -0.009 -0.01
(0.005) (0.005)
Share with Wage Loss -0.098 -0.099
(0.006) (0.007)
Turnover Rate 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Share from Largest Team -0.011 -0.012
(0.006) (0.006)
Firm Size 0.021 0.023
(0.004) (0.004)
Median Wage -0.097 -0.098
(0.006) (0.006)
Average Worker Age 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of observations 29834 29834
log Likelihood 22881 22893
F-test 23.85 15.01
Notes: Estimation results from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the the share of female employees relative
to 3-digit industry average. Standard errors in parenthesis. Aggregate hires measured at the 2-digit industry and
nuts2 regional level. Quarters refer to quarters since ﬁrm entry. Largest group is the largest group of workers who
worked together in the same previous ﬁrm. All regressions also control for 22 year eﬀects, 3 quarter eﬀects, 160
industry eﬀects, and 35 region speciﬁc eﬀects. F-test for joint signiﬁcance of the instrumental variables; degrees
of freedom (4,321) and (8,321). Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit industry and nuts2 regional level.
39Table A.2: Determinants of Firm Survival - Excluding industries with a high share of part-
time work
All Firms Larger Firms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of Female Employees -0.668 -0.521 -0.541 -2.829 -4.711 -5.224
Rel. to Industry Average (0.135) (0.134) (0.130) (0.648) (1.184) (1.963)
Share of Female Employees 2.255 3.913 3.999
Rel. to Industry Average Squared (0.626) (1.152) (1.930)
Share from Employment -1.167 -0.667 -0.653 -0.649 -0.968
(0.090) (0.107) (0.107) (0.173) (0.286)
Share from Unemployment -0.196 -0.182 -0.183 -0.086 -0.093
(0.105) (0.109) (0.109) (0.175) (0.292)
Share with Wage Gain 0.502 0.425 0.421 0.495 0.188
(0.091) (0.094) (0.094) (0.147) (0.254)
Share with Wage Loss 0.755 0.673 0.667 0.684 0.711
(0.100) (0.103) (0.103) (0.168) (0.281)
Turnover Rate 0.416 0.406 0.392 0.274
(0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.067)
Share from Largest Group -0.702 -0.695 -0.706 -0.441
(0.111) (0.111) (0.173) (0.286)
Share of White Collar Workers -0.258 -0.151 -0.015 -0.015 0.137 0.062
Rel. to Industry Average (0.116) (0.115) (0.112) (0.111) (0.187) (0.305)
Firm Size -0.773 -0.767 -0.602 -0.573 -0.652 -0.519
(0.163) (0.158) (0.149) (0.146) (0.190) (0.219)
Median Wage -0.517 -0.360 -0.258 -0.247 -0.132 -0.096
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.066) (0.107)
Average Worker Age 0.009 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.023
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 19114 19114 19114 19114 9385 4301
log-likelihood -46368 -46210 -46024 -46018 -19581 -7772
Notes: Estimation results from Cox regressions. Dependent variable is the survival time in quarters. Standard
errors in parenthesis. Share of female workers relative to industry average is measured by the ratio of female to
all employees relative to 3-digit industry average. Largest group is the share of the largest group of workers who
worked together in the same previous ﬁrm. Column 5 includes ﬁrms with at least 10 employees; column 6 includes
ﬁrms with at least 15 employees. All regressions also control for 22 year eﬀects, 3 quarter eﬀects, 143 industry
eﬀects, and 35 region speciﬁc eﬀects. Excluded industries: Retail Sales, Services related to tourism, education,
health, security, market research, janitorial services, temp work ﬁrms, unspeciﬁed other services
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